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PROBLEMS AND PROSPECTS 
IN ATOMIC ENERGY 
Rear Admiral w; K Parsons, U. S. 'f;v. 
Admiral Smith and Gentlemen of the War College:-
I think that the best way to start a discussion on problems 
and prospects in atomic energy is to cover a few basic definitions of 
Nuclear Physics. First, nuclear fission, which is induced in the 
nuclei of several atoms at the heavy end of the atomic series. The 
nuclear fission which concerns us is fission of the Uranium 235 
and Plutonium. nuclei. In both of these nuclei the disturbance be­
gins when a neutron enters the nucleus. .Since a neutron, by defini­
tion, has no electrical charge, it is neither attracted nor repelled by 
the nucleus, so that most impacts are penetrative. Immediately, 
after the neutron has penetrated a Uranium 235 or Plutonium 
nucleus, a major disturbance takes place in this very dense sphere 
of "jelly". The balance between electrical repulsion and sub-atomic 
cohesive forces is so upset that the sphere turns into a dumbbell 
shape, then the terrific electrical repulsion of the two . smaller 
"bells" accelerates them to very high velocities. As they break 
apart, each of them snaps. ba�k into spherical shape, . This violent 
oscillation of the. new nuclei results in ejection of"one or more 
neutrons by eac!i new nucleus. In about one percent of the cases, this 
ejection of a neutron is delayed for a time ranging up to a few 
seconds. 
The essential· properties of a mi.cleat fuel or . explosive are 
two : first, that it must be fissionable by slow or fast neutrons in 
the sense that I have just described; second, that the result of its 
fission must not 'only be the release of energy, but also the release 
Admiral Parsons is Director of Atomic Defense in the Office of CNO. 
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of a sufficient number of neutrons to cause further fission. It is a 
scientific fact that the nuclei of only three atoms fulfill the two 
requirements which make them nuclear fuels. These three atoms 
are the 239 Isotope of Plutonium and two isotopes of Uranium, 
namely, Uranium 233 and Uranium 235. Two of these three known 
nuclear fuels do not occur in nature, and, therefore, must be pro­
duced artificially by transmutation. Plutonium is produced by 
bombardment of Uranium 238 with neutrons, resulting in Pluton­
ium 239. Uranium 233 is produced by neutron bombardment of 
Thorium 232 which results in Uranium 233. It is an odd and some-
. what ironic fact that to produce the two man-made nuclear fuels in 
usable amounts, it is necessary to "burn" Uranium 235, the only 
natural fuel, in order to get the astronomical number of neutro,ns 
required in the process. 
Up to now, I have casually referred to isotopes. I know 
from experience that many people are unfamiliar with the meaning 
of this Greek word. The term isotope is used to differentiate be­
tween atoms of the same element which have different weights. The 
chemical properties of an atom do not depend on the weight of the 
nucleus, but only on the number of electrical charges in the nucleus. 
By our present concept, this means the number of protons in the 
nucleus. Thus, there are three known isotopes of Hydrogen. Or­
dinary Hydrogen has a nucleus consisting of a single proton. Heavy 
Hydrogen, or Deuterium, has a proton and a neutron in the nuclous, 
whereas Tritium, or triple-weight Hydrogen, has ·a proton and two 
neutrons in its nucleus. 
Having disposed of nuclear chemistry, we now come to the 
term "critical mass" of fissionable material. An exact definition of 
critical mass would require several pages of fine print, but an over­
simplified one is all that we need here. There is no analogy to a 
critical mass in the case of chemical fuels or explosives. If there 
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were, it would be impossible to make a sub-critical amount of TNT 
or coal ignite, but a super-critical amount would ignite spontaneous­
ly. For our purposes, a critical mass of fissionable material can be 
defined as the amount reached when the number of neutrons which 
escape from the surface is exactly balanced by the number of new 
neutrons created by fission within the mass. Obviously, an im­
portant factor in the critical size or mass ·is the number of neu­
trons released per fission. If this number were less than one and 
one-half for example, .the critical mass would be tremendous and 
the volume might exceed the size of this room. In that case, further 
discussion of atomic energy would be quite academic. 
Now, having defined a critical mass, the question of producing 
an explosion arises. My favorite way to discuss an atomic bomb in 
unclassified language is to picture two hams in a butcher shop. Each 
of the hams is sub-critical by itself. The flies in the butcher shop are 
the neutrons, and, as long as the hams are more than a diameter 
apart, a fly landing on either of them does not produce a chain re­
action which builds up. However, if the hams are brought together 
in some fasliion so that no fly lands on either of them until they have 
merged, there will be a real surprise when the next fly lands. In 
this case, we have surprised Nature by presenting her with a highly 
super-critical assembly. Nature then gets back at us by presenting 
us with a runaway chain reaction called an atomic explosion. In the 
case of an atomic bomb, there are two important time intervals. 
First, the assembly interval which involves mechanical movement, 
and, therefore, is relatively slow. The second interval is measured 
in fractions of a millionth of a second. It starts with the beginning 
of the runaway chain reaction and ends when the fissionable ma­
terial has expanded to a point at which it is again below critical. 
I would turn now to the effects of this atomic explosion. The· 
first effect considered is blast. We are all familiar with the destruc-
3 
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tive effect of blast from bombs with chemical high explosives. In 
these pre-atomic bombs, the blast is intense in the immediate vicinity 
of the bomb but is of very short duration. It delivers a hammer blow 
or very sharp impulse to any unyielding material in the vicinity. In 
the case of an atomic bomb, material in the immediate vicinity, of 
course, would be incandescent. At distances of the order of one­
half mile, the push of the shock wave and mass movement of the air 
lasts ten to one hundred times longer than the sharp push of an ordi­
nary block-buster. Therefore, it is effective in knocking down 
buildings and other structures which are built to withstand only the 
side pressure of a hurricane or the shaking of a mild earthquake. 
It is important to remember that a building has a tremendous 
amount of potential energy which is released when it falls on. itself. 
Then, if a falling building sets itself on fire, it proceeds to release 
a great deal of chemical energy. The point is, that an atomic bomb 
does not, by its own power, obliterate a city. It merely starts things 
and the city then obliterates itself. 
In the case of Hiroshima, the only effect of the atomic blast 
was to raise a curtain of dust about, 200 feet thick over the smashed 
city. Only one fire was visible one minute after the bomb detonated, 
and that was on a hillside. Perhaps some blacksmith shop had been 
knocked down. 
As Los Alamos was being organized, we did a lot of. talking 
about the explosion of an ammunition ship in Halifax Harbor in De­
cember 1917. That ship carried the equivalent of 2800 tons of TNT, 
and the explosion was reported to have had terrible effects on the 
city. We studied these reports carefully, butit w.as not until after 
the explosion of an ammunition ship at Port Chicago, in July 1944, 
that we became realistic in our estimate of blast damage. In the 
case of Port Chicago, which was an ammunition depot north of San 
Francisco, 1600 tons of high explosives detonated. I arrived at the 
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age, The Naval magazine at Port Chicago had built-in protection 
against large explosions. With some luck, this protection was ef­
fective in preventing any secondary explosions or fires. In - the 
light of the Port Chicago results, we reanalyzed the Halifax re­
ports and concluded that a major factor in the Halifax disaster was 
a record blizzard which struck the city a. few hours after the ex­
plosion. 
The results of Halifax and Port Chicago have been confirmed 
on a larger scale by Hiroshima, Nagasaki and Bikinf "ABLE". 
From these we can conclude that no spectacular blast damage will be 
done to tough structures like bridges, steel ships and heavy rein­
forced concrete buildings. Naturally, there would be a short range, 
say a few hundred yards, inside which practically any structure 
above ground would be rendered useless. 
·1 have already covered damage f!om secondary.fires. There
is a·further hazard from primary fires caused by the radiant heat of 
th� bomb. I do not believe that this primary heat hazard is very 
serious except to exposed people. While wood and other inflam­
mable material will char and smolder, .any flash ·fires are apt to be 
blown out by the violent blast which arrives withina second or so. 
A most import�nt factor in the lethality of an air burst 
atomic bomb comes from the radioactivity. In this case, the over­
whelming effect is from gamma radiation artd all of this radiation 
dosage is received in the fir'st few seconds after the bomb detonates. 
After this, the ball' of fire,.•has· risen so far toward the strato­
sphere that it no longer irradiates the dty. An air burst placed 
for maximum blast damage will not deposit arty radioactive ma� 
terial on a city. People within a mile of an air ·burst bomb, who 
have been shielded in some fashion from the radiant heat but not 
shielded from the penetrating gamma radiation will show no effects 
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for several hours. Then, if they have received heavy dosage they 
will become nauseated, and, in case of extreme exposure, will die 
within a few days. 1 Marginal cases will show ordinary infections 
within a week. These arise from the fact that the radiation kills 
the unborn white corpuscles in the blood, and, therefore, the �ody 
is unable to fight off normal infections. Red blood corpuscles are 
also affected, but their cycle of repla�ement is longer, so this effect 
shows up after several weeks. Combatting infection by use of 
Penicillin and replacing blood by transfusion in marginal cases help 
recovery. 
The semi-permanent radioactive contamination caused by 
· the underwater atomic burst in the Bikini "BAKER" test has been
given great prominence as the first sample of radioactive war­
fare. It is certainly true that the mist called the "base surge",
which was formed by the falling column of water, initially con­
tained the equivalent of one thousand tons of radium and deposited
an appreciable amount of this poison in the water and on the tar­
get ships. Such a. drenching would almost certainly have killed
most of the crews of the ships which were completely enveloped.
But, a most important point to remember is that the intensity
of the gamma radiation from the fission fragments of an atomic
burst decreases rapidly with time. Thus,' at the end of sixty min­
utes, the radiation intensity is perhaps one percent of what it was
at one minute. And, at the end of twenty-four hours, it has de­
creased to say one-thirtieth of what it was at one hour. It requires
very delicate instruments to record the radiation intensity in the
remaining Bikini target ships two years after the "BAKER" test.
If the Bikini "BAKER" test is a sample of. radioactive warfare, it
can be said that our experience .in handling the aftermath of an
atomic attack indicates that the principal difficulties are logistic
and administrative. By this I mean supply and replacement of
clothing and keeping complete records of the· exposure accumulated
by all men who work in contaminated spaces.
6 
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Since there has been confusion on this point, I would like to 
emphasize that Uranium and Plutonium do not give off gamma 
radiation, and, therefore, do not require heavy shielding to protect 
people in the immediate vicinity. For example, you could sit on an 
unshielded atomic bomb indefinitely without damage to yourself 
or your descendants. It follows from this fact, that no radiation 
detection instrument so far conceived would have any chanc_e of de­
tecting even an unshielded atomic bomb at a distance exceeding a 
foot ortwo. 
Up to now, I have discussed the uncontrolled chain reactions 
of atomic bombs. A controlled chain reaction in a pile or nuclear 
reactor involves us in many difficult problems which are skipped 
in the case of the bomb. The controlled chain reaction was used in 
the Hanford Uranium-Carbon piles to produce Plutonium. In this 
case, the neutrons were produced from the fission or burning of 
Uranium 235 atoms contained in the ratio of about 1 to 139 atoms 
of Uranium 238 in natural Uranium. The wartime goal of the 
Hanford Project was to transmute atoms of Uranium 238 into 
Plutonium, which is a different element. In this way, the newly 
created fissionable substances could be removed from the remaining 
metallic Uranium by chemical processes. Therefore, success in the 
Hanford Project was not dependent on creating a Plutonium atom 
for every Uranium 235 atom burned up in the process. Further­
more, the heat produced in the process was an unwanted by-product 
rather than something to be desired. Therefore, the fact that, in 
operation, the Hanford reactors produced a net decrease in total 
fissionable atoms, and also worked at such low temperatures that 
the heat produced was unusable, was accepted gratefully in ex-: 
change for usable amounts of Plutonium. 
In modern atomic jargon, the Hanford reactor is a negative 
breeder. A positive breeder would be one in which advantage is 
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taken of the fact that more than two neutrons are produced per 
fission and an attempt is made to capture these neutrons· so effec­
tively in Thorium or Uranium 238 nuclei that the total number of 
fissionable atoms actually increases as the chain reaction proceeeds. 
' ' . . . 
The arithmetic of the breeding process is fairly simple-c--for an _in-
vestment of one neutron in a Uranium 235 nucleus you get out 
something more than two neutrons. Naturally, one of these neu­
trons must be reinvested to maintain the · chain reaction, and one 
more must be captured in a Uranium 238 or Thorium nucleus to 
replace the Uranium 235 nucleus which has previously fissioned. 
> The excess, beyond the two neutrons which came out of the fission,
would, in theory, be available for additional capture, and, there­
fore, creation of more fissionable atoms. So far, positive breeding 
cycles exist only in theory: They are, of course, recognized ·as 
tremendously important if they can be achieved in practice. 
The problem of designing nuclear reactors to operate at high 
temperatures is quite independent of breeding. In this case, the 
vital questions are chemical and metallurgical, and, certainly, for 
mobile power plants, the question of shielding against the intense 
gamma radiation and neutrons is of major importance. 
It is well to remark that generation of industrial atomic 
power on a large scale, in the absen�e of positive breeding, is not 
justifiable on the basis of national security. It would be a very 
complicated and expensive method of disarming ourselves by burn­
ing up most of our stockpile of nuclear fuel. In the case of pro­
pulsion of military vehicles, such as aircraft and submarines, 
there is a legitimate competition with bombs for the available 
stock of nuclear fuel. Furthermore, since the development of pro­
totypes can be prosecuted in each case without major expenditure of 
nuclear fuel,. there is every reason to proceed with the development 
of mobile pow�r plants for aircraft and submarines on an urgent 
basis. Then, when the developments bear f:ruit, the national 
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economy of nuclear fuel, or the strategic situation with respect to 
employment of the fuel in power plants or bombs, may have 
changed. 
The problem of propelling a submarine by nuclear power 
is roughly a factor of ten simpler than nuclear propulsion of a 
manned aircraft. There are two major factors in this compari­
son; the first having to do with thermodynamics, and the second 
having to do with shielding weight. Submarine designers are quite 
willing to accept propellers driven by steam turbines, whereas, 
such a solution would be unacceptable to aircraft designers in this 
age of jet propulsion. · Therefore, the aircraft nuclear power-plant 
must operate at the high temperatures required by a turbo-jet 
system. 
In regard to shielding, it so happens that, while very heavy 
·shielding is required in the submarine reactor, this weight can still
be carried by the submarine, whereas, the same shielding weight
would make the airplane unable to fly.
Regardless of the technically dim prospect of achieving nu­
clear powered flight, barring some new discovery, the tremendous 
gain in milit�ry performance which nuclear power with its practi­
cally weightless fuel would give is ample justification for making a. 
well controlled and carefully guided major effort to achieve this 
goal. 
Another major problem in the atomic age relates to the 
amount of usable Uranium ore. In the present state of knowledge 
of mining and geology, high grade Uranium ore is extremely lim­
ited. Prospecting for high grade Uranium ore has gone on on a 
non-urgent basis for two generations simply because radium ce1uld 
only be found in Uranium deposits. The findings in this search 
have been that considerable deposits are located in the Great 
9 
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Bear Lake region of Canada, in ·Czechoslovakia and in ·the Belgian 
Congo. Deposits of low grade ore, in'. which the Uranium is a by­
product pf processing for other minerals, are distributed fairly 
generally throughout the world. But the impact pf the new de­
mand for Uranium as a. material of crucial importance has not yet 
produced major changes in the mining and processing industries. 
It is probable that during the coming generation the definition of 
economical and uneconomical in the mining of Uranium will be 
greatly changed. The changes will, of course, be affected by any 
new discoveries of freakishly rich deposits. 
Thorium is of secondary importance, although more of it is 
available than Uranium. The reason, of course, is that it is not 
directly fissionable, and, unless positive breeding becomes a reality, 
Thorium would not be of really great significance. 
Another problem in prospect in the atomic age relates to 
the phifosophy of design and development of atomic weapons and 
vehicles for their delivery. At least, so far as the weapons are 
concerned, security restrictions prevent much beyond generaliza­
tions. This is unfortunate because sound rational thinking in the 
field of atomic weapons depends to a considerable extent on elilni­
nating· mystery and black magic and getting down to what I call 
the "nuts and bolts" approach. Nuclear fission, neutrons and 
atomic bomb assembly designs are just as much plain facts of life 
of the modern age as are electronics and its application in radar. 
The philosophy of the wartime atomic bomb development 
assigned tremendous importance to the reliability of the bomb 
design and delivery system. At that time, and to a certain extent 
now, a mechanical or electrical failure of an atomic bomb which 
frustrated its delivery would be such poor overall economy that it 
should be avoided even at very large cost. 
lQ 
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Conventional military vehicles and weapons have been de­
veloped by a process of trial and error. The unique feature in 
atomic bomb development has been, and still is, the fact that we 
are permitted a microscopic number of trials and we allow our­
selves no errors. This thinking permeated our wartime philosophy 
and resulted in eighteen months of intense development activity in 
which full scale dummy bombs were dropped from B-29's under 
conditions representative of combat missions. As the development 
proceeded, the dummies more and more approached the real McCoy. 
For example, the 'final rehearsal of the -Hiroshima flight was a 
flight from Tinian to Iwo Jima and return to the vicinity of 
Tinian where a non-nuclear duplicate of the Hiroshima bomb was 
dropped. 
No' amount of attention and effort spent on the bomb itself 
could overcome weakness, in the delivery system caused, for ex� 
ample, by unreliability of the aircraft or its crew, opposition by 
the enemy, or unfavorable weather. Identifying and bombing the 
target by radar alone was not considered sufficiently reliable. It 
was part of our luck that, by the time enough fissionable material 
I 
had been produced by Oak Ridge and Hanford, our non-nuclear 
components were developed and ready, and a practically pe:i;fect 
ready-made B-29 delivery organization was available and in full 
, operation from the Mariannas to Japan. Under those practically 
ideal conditions of guaranteed efficiency of the delivery system, 
and absolute control of the air over the target, delivery became a 
demonstration. 
In my opinion, much fallacious thinking has been generated 
by the striking success of the first two atomic' deliveries. The 
effect has been to lead many articulate thinkers, including military 
planners, unconsciously to discount the effect of difficulties which 
-would plague future deliveries in manned subsonic bombers.
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In actual fact, the conventional long-range bomber passed its 
peak of effectiveness in 1944 with the. first appearance of the Ger­
man jet propelled fighter. The atomic delivery situation over 
Japan would have been entirely different if we had faced strong 
forces of German jet fighters over the Empire. I am sure that 
our approach to the delivery would have been entirely different and 
would probably have included heavy escort. 
Naturally, the speed of the delivery vehicle when it equals 
or exceeds that of our present jet fighters, confers an increasing 
amount of protection. Present thinking would concede practical 
invulnerability to a delivery vehicle which travels at more than twice 
the velocity of sound. 
The major limiting factors in the case of guided missiles 
are in propulsion and guidance· at ranges of significance to atomic 
bomb delivery. As I have indicated earlier, the effective radius of 
destruction of an atomic bomb is not so great that we can tolerate . 
errors of a mile or more in placing it on the target. This fact re­
quires achievement of a high degree of discrimination and re­
liability in the navigation brains of an unmanned missile before it 
can'. b� entrusted with an atomic warhead. The final choice be­
tween manned and unmanned delivery will always depend on the 
characteristics of the target, the defense, and the relative location of 
the launching base. 
Now to change from: purely material and operational consid­
erations to an examination of attitudes.. I was impressed through­
out the atomic weapon development period of World War II, say 
from 1943 to the actual deliveries from the Mariannas, with the ab­
solute, hard-boiled, realistic, and pragmatic approach of the scient­
ists. They refused to credit even their own best radar systems de­
veloped at M. I. T. with being able to identify a target city under 
difficult conditions. Even in the Gase of Hiroshima, which was a 
12 
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river delta with practically no similarity to any other seaport with­
in hundreds of miles, the scientists and military planners demanded 
visual delivery. The thoroughness of our preparations was shown 
by the fact that up to within two hours of strike time we had weather 
planes circling over our several targets. 
At the end of World War II, the attitude of our vocal 
scientists was abruptly changed from hardboiled realism and 
pessimism to a sort of mystic, uncritical acceptance of wild claims 
which they had been the first to dismiss during the war. If you 
have seen the movie "One World or None", which was put out in an 
effort to promote world government, you may remember the state­
ment in the ringing voice of Raymond Gram Swing: "The B-29's 
which delivered the atomic bombs to Hiroshima and Nagasaki had a 
range of 1500 miles. Within six months after the war's end, the 
range of atomic bomb carrying airplanes had increased to 6000 
miles!" That statement was approved for the script by some of 
the same scientists who would have refused to credit the B-29 with 
a range of 1800 miles during World War II. 
This change of attitude perhaps resulted from shock. I 
would illustrate further effects of this shock by quoting from an 
article by W. A. Higginbotham, in the New York Times, Magazine 
Section, November 3, 1946: " ______ no scientist sees any possibility of 
defense, for two main reasons : 
"1. Because atomic energy is the basic energy of the universe and 
its crushing force is all-powerful. 
"2. Because man will always make mistakes in the operation of any 
defense system." 
"Neither of these factors will change. There can be no defense 
against the atomic bomb". This quotation is a typical example of 
13 
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the sincerely motivated campaign of the atomic scientists, conduct­
ed throughout 1946 and the early part of 1947. 
Now I will read a comment on the effect of such a campaign, 
written by an expert in psychological warfare, who was in charge of 
the Psychological Branch of the Dutch War Ministry and a member 
of the Inter-Allied Psychological Study Group in England during 
the late war. This was in a letter to the New York Times, in June 
1947. I will read extracts from it: 
"The general idea in this atomic war of nerves appears to be 
that fear of another war and fear of the bomb's tremendous des­
truction will force mankind nearer to a constructive plan for peace. 
This idea, however, must be contested since, down through the 
ages, fear has been a notoriously bad leader of mankind. Too 
great a fear ends in one of two reactions, neither of which is con­
structive. 
''In the first place, such a fear can paralyze the human mind 
-hypnotize it, as it were, make it passive, ready to accept dangers
of war rather than bear the nervous tension of peace. In
Psychology we call it passive surrender to the thing feared.
"On the other hand, such a fear, which still works on the 
human mind as primitive fear did in the ancient world, can pro­
voke mankind to frantic explosions of aggression . When fear af­
fects men in this manner they try to deal the first blow-to cast the 
first bomb. 
" 
"The confused state of mind, resulting from this combination 
of post-war guilt feelings and the fears engendered by the atomic 
war of nerves, resembles ancient periods when people waited pass­
ively for the world's doom because of an undefined magic spell and 
14 
14
Naval War College Review, Vol. 1 [1948], No. 3, Art. 2
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol1/iss3/2
RESTRICTED 
mysterious fear passed on from general anxiety with which the 
world of those days we.re infected. In the middle ages this kind 
of mood spread along with the pandemics of the epoch ( the Black 
Death, Plague, etc.). 
" 
"During the hectic days when the Germans were success­
fully executing their war of nerves I thought that I had seen some 
deadly psychological warfare, but none of those attacks, I now feel, 
could out-do the atomic war of nerves to which we are being sub­
jected." 
In my opinion, this mystic attitude toward the atomic bomb 
has become dangerously widespread in the United States and has af­
fected the thinking of many intelligent people, including military 
'planners. The general idea seems to be that the potency of the 
atomic bomb somehow lends a considerable degree of invulner­
ability to its carrying vehicle, that the "absolute" weapon will be 
delivered. "inevitably" to the intended target, and that the results 
will be cataclysmic to the target. 
It is of crucial importance to our national defense that all 
of these shaky, unprovable assumptions be subjected to the most 
searching and skeptical analysis and test. It should also be re­
membered that whatever we know, or do not know, about the abil­
ity of our possible enemies to produce and deliver atomic bombs, 
they most certainly are aware of our capabilities in this respect. 
Therefore, if we are provoked into a war, even a Hitler will have 
anticipated and made reasonable allowances for our known ability to 
strike his key ·cities with atomic bombs. 
I worry when I see in the Saturday Evening Post of Septem­
ber 11, 1948, an article by Joseph and Stewart Alsop, from which 
I will read an extract: 
15 
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"What is novel in the new concept is the additional pro­
vision of a small, specialized offensive force, such as was not avail­
able to the democracies in 1914 or 1939. Only a minor percentage 
of total resources will be invested in this special force, which will be 
composed primarily of long-range bombers. But the bombers will 
carry the absolute weapons, and will have the mission of destroy­
ing the enemy's vitals in immediate retaliation for the first ag­
gressive act. By this destruction of the enemy's vitals, it is hoped 
that the general counter-offensive will become possible not after 
four years but after as many months. It is hoped, in short, that even 
if the deterrent fails, even if war comes despite all our labors to 
avoid it, the war may yet be short and the world we know may 
yet be saved. 
"In illustration of what one must pray will never occur, let 
us suppose that the worst has happened. War has begun after the 
new strategic concept has been implemented. Of the uncounted 
divisions of . the .Soviet empire, as many as can be rapidly trans­
ported-probably over 100-will be instantly launched across 
Europe toward the English Channel. The nations of the Western 
European Union will dispose their forty-five divisions on their se­
lected defensive line--most probably the Rhine, which is so distant 
from Russia that logistical factors will limit the first impact of the 
Red Army's attack. Fleets of transports will be gathered to 
strengthen the divisions of Europe with divisions from the United 
States. 
"As the battle is joined on land, the struggle for control of 
the seas will break out with fury, for the Red Fleet now possesses 
a formidable submarine force. Sabotage also will begin, of such 
character and on such a scale as will seriously impede the first ef­
fort of the West. 
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"Meanwhile, however, on the first notice of attack, orders 
will go out to the special offensive force. · From the United States, 
long trains of aircraft will fly, by day and night, to their pre­
pared bases across the Atlantic. There, at points beyond the im� 
mediate reach of the strong Russian Ground Arm, will be all the 
facilities, all the supplies for immediate air warfare, from run­
ways to hospitals, from gasoline to ammunition. While the vast 
Soviet Army is still grinding across Europe, the air missions will 
strike out-1800 miles, 2000 miles, 2200 miles-toward the targets 
of E,ussia. From Baku north to Leningrad, from Smolensk west 
to Novosibirsk, the vitals of the Soviet State will be scorched and 
destroyed with the terrible fire of the atomic bomb. 
"Soon, at the distant front, the disaster at the center will 
be felt. The Giant's arm will still be brawny, but he will be sorely 
stricken at the heart. As the arm falters from the heart's injury, 
so must the Red Army falter if cut off from all support except 
from the sullen satellites. And then the forces of the West, which 
once seemed almost too weak for defense, will of a sudden become 
strong enough for the attack. The change in relative strengths 
will permit a general counter-offensive by the Western Armies in 
which all will join. And the great war machine will be hurled 
back across Europe, along the road by which it came." 
Meditating on this extract, I think back to an article in 
Esquire Magazine for January 1942, which was already on the 
newstands on December 7, 1941. In it an American expert on Jap­
an included these as the clinching and last paragraphs of his 
article: 
"Japanese fighting men have proved their courage in suc­
cessives victories; their courage under a preliminary def eat is yet 
to be shown. They have demonstrated their fighting prowess 
against poorer trained and slower thinking people; they have yet to 
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meet a nation that can out-think them, as can every other nation 
today ranking as a first-class power. Those who know the Jap­
anese do not believe they could stand up in any vital test of the kind, 
except in defense of their homeland, when they could fight on their 
own terms on a terrain they know thoroughly and for the land they 
love. 
"As ·a menace to any country of any fighting consequence, 
Japan does not exist. 
"As a first-class power, Japan is a myt�. 
"The sooner this· fact is recognized, the sooner will all talk 
of war with Japan die away, to the betterment of the world and to 
the betterment of Japan." 
The warnings I have given are certainly not intended to 
belittle the atomi� bomb in any respect. They are primarily directed. 
toward a return of our thinking to the hardboiled, realistic kind 
which pr�duced the bomb in the first place. We have need of such 1 
thinking in these parlous times. 
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